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Ir a Avira Answers
Date discovered:15/12/2005
In the wild:Yes
Reported Infections:Low
Distribution Potential:Medium
Damage Potential:Medium
Static file:Yes
File size:191.488 Bytes
MD5 checksum:10edc1205b4fa42235d02ca006855515
VDF version:

 General Method of propagation:
   • Local network

   •  Symantec: W32.Spybot.Worm
   •  Kaspersky: Backdoor.Win32.Rbot.akr
   •  TrendMicro: WORM_RBOT.DID
   •  F-Secure: Backdoor.Win32.Rbot.akr
   •  Sophos: W32/Rbot-BFM
   •  Panda: Bck/Sdbot.FYA
   •  VirusBuster: Worm.Rbot.DFO
   •  Bitdefender: Backdoor.Rbot.AKR

Side effects:
   • Lowers security settings
   • Records keystrokes
   • Registry modification
   • Makes use of software vulnerability
   • Third party control

 Files It copies itself to the following location:
   • %SYSDIR%\msnimsgr.exe

It deletes the initially executed copy of itself.

The following file is created:


 Registry The following registry keys are added in order to run the processes after reboot:

– HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
   • "MSN Messenger"="msnimsgr.exe"

– HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunServices
   • "MSN Messenger"="msnimsgr.exe"

– HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run
   • "MSN Messenger"="msnimsgr.exe"

The following registry keys are added in order to load the service after reboot:

– HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\SVKP
   • "Type"=dword:00000001
   • "Start"=dword:00000002
   • "ErrorControl"=dword:00000001
   • "ImagePath"="%SYSDIR%\SVKP.sys"
   • "DisplayName"="SVKP"

The following registry keys are changed:

– HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole
   Old value:
   • "EnableDCOM"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "EnableDCOM"="N"

– HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
   Old value:
   • "restrictanonymous"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "restrictanonymous"=dword:00000001

 Network Infection In order to ensure its propagation the malware attemps to connect to other machines as described below.

It drops copies of itself to the following network shares:
   • IPC$
   • C$
   • ADMIN$

It uses the following login information in order to gain access to the remote machine:

–Cached usernames and passwords.

– A list of usernames and passwords:
   • intranet; lan; main; winpass; blank; office; control; nokia; siemens;
      compaq; dell; cisco; ibm; orainstall; sqlpassoainstall; sql; db1234;
      db1; databasepassword; data; databasepass; dbpassword; dbpass; access;
      domainpassword; domainpass; domain; hello; hell; god; sex; slut;
      bitch; fuck; exchange; backup; technical; loginpass; login; mary;
      katie; kate; george; eric; chris; ian; neil; lee; brian; susan; sue;
      sam; luke; peter; john; mike; bill; fred; joe; jen; bob; qwe; zxc;
      asd; qaz; win2000; winnt; winxp; win2k; win98; windows; oeminstall;
      oemuser; oem; user; homeuser; home; accounting; accounts; internet;
      www; web; outlook; mail; qwerty; null; server; system; changeme;
      linux; unix; demo; none; test; 2004; 2003; 2002; 2001; 2000;
      1234567890; 123456789; 12345678; 1234567; 123456; 12345; 1234; 123;
      007; pwd; pass; pass1234; passwd; password; password1; adm; db2;
      oracle; dba; database; default; guest; wwwadmin; teacher; student;
      owner; computer; root; staff; admin; admins; administrat;
      administrateur; administrador; administrator

– MS03-026 (Buffer Overrun in RPC Interface)
– MS03-039 (Buffer Overrun in RPCSS Service)
– MS04-011 (LSASS Vulnerability)

IP address generation:
It creates random IP addresses while it keeps the first two octets from its own address. Afterwards it tries to establish a connection with the created addresses.

Infection process:
Creates a TFTP script on the compromised machine in order to download the malware to the remote location.

Remote execution:
–It attempts to schedule a remote execution of the malware, on the newly infected machine. Therefore it uses the NetScheduleJobAdd function.

 IRC To deliver system information and to provide remote control it connects to the following IRC Server:

Server: xi3.n2.pim.irc-**********
Channel: #xisnet#
Nickname: %eight-digit random character string%
Password: xq0

– This malware has the ability to collect and send information such as:
    • CPU speed
    • Current user
    • Details about drivers
    • Free disk space
    • Free memory
    • Information about the network
    • Information about running processes
    • Size of memory
    • Username
    • Information about the Windows operating system

– Furthermore it has the ability to perform actions such as:
    • Launch DDoS ICMP flood
    • Launch DDoS SYN flood
    • Launch DDoS TCP flood
    • Launch DDoS UDP flood
    • Disable DCOM
    • Disable network shares
    • Download file
    • Enable DCOM
    • Enable network shares
    • Execute file
    • Join IRC channel
    • Kill process
    • Leave IRC channel
    • Open remote shell
    • Perform DDoS attack
    • Perform network scan
    • Perform port redirection
    • Register a service
    • Restart system
    • Send emails
    • Start keylog
    • Start spreading routine
    • Terminate malware
    • Terminate process
    • Updates itself
    • Upload file

 Process termination List of processes that are terminated:
   • i11r54n4.exe; irun4.exe; d3dupdate.exe; rate.exe; ssate.exe;
      winsys.exe; winupd.exe; SysMonXP.exe; bbeagle.exe; Penis32.exe;
      teekids.exe; MSBLAST.exe; mscvb32.exe; sysinfo.exe; PandaAVEngine.exe;
      wincfg32.exe; taskmon.exe; zonealarm.exe; navapw32.exe; navw32.exe;
      zapro.exe; msblast.exe; netstat.exe; msconfig.exe; regedit.exe

 Miscellaneous Mutex:
It creates the following Mutex:
   • nt

 File details Programming language:
The malware program was written in MS Visual C++.

Runtime packer:
In order to aggravate detection and reduce size of the file it is packed with a runtime packer.

Descripción insertada por Irina Boldea el lunes, 10 de abril de 2006
Descripción actualizada por Irina Boldea el martes, 11 de abril de 2006

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