Virus: Worm/Korgo.U Date discovered: 24/06/2004 Type: Worm In the wild: Yes Reported Infections: Low Distribution Potential: Medium Damage Potential: Medium Static file: Yes File size: 9.728 Bytes MD5 checksum: e73c129128c47f948f25f8745ebada4c
General Method of propagation: • Local network Aliases: • Symantec: W32.Korgo.V • Mcafee: W32/Korgo.worm.v • Kaspersky: Net-Worm.Win32.Padobot.m • TrendMicro: WORM_KORGO.V • F-Secure: Net-Worm.Win32.Padobot.m • Sophos: W32/Korgo-T • Grisoft: Worm/Padobot.V • Eset: Win32/Korgo.V • Bitdefender: Win32.Worm.Korgo.U Platforms / OS: • Windows 95 • Windows 98 • Windows 98 SE • Windows NT • Windows ME • Windows 2000 • Windows XP • Windows 2003 Side effects: • Registry modification • Makes use of software vulnerability • Steals information • Third party control Files It copies itself to the following location: • %SYSDIR% \%random character string% .exe It deletes the following file: • %SYSDIR% \ftpupd.exe Registry The following registry key is added in order to run the process after reboot: – [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] • Cryptographic Service="%SYSDIR% \%random character string% .exe" The values of the following registry keys are removed: – [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run] • Windows Update • MS Config v13 • avserve2.exeUpdate Service • avserve.exe • Windows Update Service • WinUpdate • SysTray • Bot Loader • System Restore Service • Disk Defragmenter • Windows Security Manager – [HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Wireless] • Client The following registry key is added: – [HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Wireless] • ID="puqwcckndpcvandicr" • Client="1" Network Infection In order to ensure its propagation the malware attemps to connect to other machines as described below. It drops a copy of itself to the following network share: • IPC$ Exploit: It makes use of the following Exploit: – MS04-011 (LSASS Vulnerability) IP address generation: It creates random IP addresses while it keeps the first two octets from its own address. Afterwards it tries to establish a connection with the created addresses. Infection process: It makes the compromised machine download the malware from the infected source computer. The downloaded file is stored on the compromised machine as: Xhttp://%current ip address% :%opened port% /%random character string% .exe Slow down: – You might also note a slight slow down due to the multiple network threads created. Backdoor The following ports are opened: – %WINDIR% \Explorer.EXE on a random TCP port in order to provide a proxy server. – %WINDIR% \Explorer.EXE on a random TCP port in order to provide an HTTP server. Contact server: All of the following: • http://www.citi-bank.ru/********** • http://www.0AB1c********** • http://www.redli********** • http://www.filesea********** • http://www.roboxcha********** • http://www.fethar********** • http://www.asech********** • http://www.master-********** • http://www.color-ba********** • http://www.kavk********** • http://www.cruto********** • http://www.kidos-ban********** • http://www.parex-ban********** • http://www.adult-emp********** • http://www.konfisk********** • http://www.xware.cj********** • http://www.mazafa********** As a result it may send information and remote control could be provided. This is done via the HTTP GET request on a PHP script. Sends information about: • Current malware status Remote control capabilities: • Download file Injection – It injects the following file into a process: %sysdir%\%random character string% .exe Process name: • explorer.exe If the malware fails, it continues running as a process. If successful, the malware process terminates while the injected part remains active. Miscellaneous Mutex: It creates the following Mutexes: • u13i • u15 • u19 • uterm19 • u12 • u13 • u14 • u11 • u18 • u17 • u8 • u10 • u16 File details Programming language: The malware program was written in MS Visual C++. Runtime packer: In order to aggravate detection and reduce size of the file it is packed with the following runtime packer: • UPX
Description inserted by Monica Ghitun on Thursday, November 8, 2007 Description updated by Monica Ghitun on Friday, November 9, 2007
Back
.
.
.
.