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Virus:Worm/SdBot.64240
Date discovered:26/09/2005
Type:Worm
In the wild:Yes
Reported Infections:Low
Distribution Potential:Medium
Damage Potential:Medium
Static file:Yes
File size:64.240 Bytes
MD5 checksum:b307cb11cbc9f302a6668e87cbcb42f9
VDF version:6.32.00.43

 General Method of propagation:
   • Local network


Aliases:
   •  Symantec: W32.Spybot.Worm
   •  Kaspersky: Backdoor.Win32.SdBot.afx
   •  TrendMicro: WORM_SDBOT.CKI
   •  Sophos: W32/Sdbot-ADP
   •  VirusBuster: Worm.SdBot.BIX
   •  Eset: IRC/SdBot
   •  Bitdefender: Backdoor.SDBot.AFX


Platforms / OS:
   • Windows 95
   • Windows 98
   • Windows 98 SE
   • Windows NT
   • Windows ME
   • Windows 2000
   • Windows XP
   • Windows 2003


Side effects:
   • Lowers security settings
   • Registry modification
   • Makes use of software vulnerability
   • Third party control

 Files It copies itself to the following location:
   • %WINDIR%\spool.exe

 Registry The following registry keys are added in order to load the service after reboot:

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\winspool32
   • "Type"=dword:00000110
   • "Start"=dword:00000002
   • "ErrorControl"=dword:00000000
   • "ImagePath"=%WINDIR%\spool.exe
   • "DisplayName"="Windows Spooler"
   • "ObjectName"="LocalSystem"
   • "FailureActions"=%hex values%
   • "Description"="Manages print jobs and keep documents in queue"



The following registry key is added:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Windows\WindowsUpdate
   • "DoNotAllowXPSP2"=dword:00000001



The following registry keys are changed:

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Security Center
   Old value:
   • "AntiVirusDisableNotify"=%user defined settings%
   • "FirewallDisableNotify"=%user defined settings%
   • "UpdatesDisableNotify"=%user defined settings%
   • "AntiVirusOverride"=%user defined settings%
   • "FirewallOverride"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "AntiVirusDisableNotify"=dword:00000001
   • "FirewallDisableNotify"=dword:00000001
   • "UpdatesDisableNotify"=dword:00000001
   • "AntiVirusOverride"=dword:00000001
   • "FirewallOverride"=dword:00000001

Deactivate Windows Firewall:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\DomainProfile
   Old value:
   • "EnableFirewall"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "EnableFirewall"=dword:00000000

Deactivate Windows Firewall:
HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\WindowsFirewall\StandardProfile
   Old value:
   • "EnableFirewall"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "EnableFirewall"=dword:00000000

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\WindowsUpdate\
   Auto Update
   Old value:
   • "AUOptions"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "AUOptions"=dword:00000001

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa
   Old value:
   • "restrictanonymous"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "restrictanonymous"=dword:00000001

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanserver\parameters
   Old value:
   • "AutoShareWks"=%user defined settings%
   • "AutoShareServer"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "AutoShareWks"=dword:00000000
   • "AutoShareServer"=dword:00000000

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\lanmanworkstation\parameters
   Old value:
   • "AutoShareWks"=%user defined settings%
   • "AutoShareServer"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "AutoShareWks"=dword:00000000
   • "AutoShareServer"=dword:00000000

HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Ole
   Old value:
   • "EnableDCOM"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "EnableDCOM"="N"

HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control
   Old value:
   • "WaitToKillServiceTimeout"=%user defined settings%
   New value:
   • "WaitToKillServiceTimeout"="7000"

 Network Infection In order to ensure its propagation the malware attemps to connect to other machines as described below.

It drops copies of itself to the following network shares:
   • Z$
   • Z$
   • Y$
   • X$
   • W$
   • V$
   • U$
   • T$
   • S$
   • R$
   • Q$
   • P$
   • O$
   • N$
   • M$
   • L$
   • K$
   • J$
   • I$
   • H$
   • G$
   • F$
   • E$
   • D$
   • C$
   • IPC$
   • ADMIN$


Exploit:
It makes use of the following Exploit:
– MS03-039 (Buffer Overrun in RPCSS Service)
– MS03-049 (Buffer Overrun in the Workstation Service)
– MS04-007 (ASN.1 Vulnerability)
– MS05-039 (Vulnerability in Plug and Play)


IP address generation:
It creates random IP addresses while it keeps the first two octets from its own address. Afterwards it tries to establish a connection with the created addresses.


Infection process:
Creates an FTP script on the compromised machine in order to download the malware to the remote location.


Remote execution:
It attempts to schedule a remote execution of the malware, on the newly infected machine. Therefore it uses the NetScheduleJobAdd function.

 IRC To deliver system information and to provide remote control it connects to the following IRC Server:

Server: ns2.cont**********
Port: 57
Channel: #4
Nickname: [P00|USA|%five-digit random character string%]
Password: r



 This malware has the ability to collect and send the following information:
    • Information about running processes


 Furthermore it has the ability to perform actions such as:
    • Download file
    • Execute file
    • Kill process
     Perform network scan
     Start spreading routine
     Updates itself

 Process termination  List of services that are disabled:
   • Security Center
   • Telnet
   • Remote Registry
   • Messenger

 Backdoor Contact server:
All of the following:
   • http://hpcgi1.nifty.com/mute/c/**********
   • http://www.age.ne.jp/x/maxwell/cgi-bin/**********
   • http://www2.dokidoki.ne.jp/tomocrus/cgi-bin/check/**********
   • http://cgi14.plala.or.jp/little_w/**********
   • http://yia.s22.xrea.com/**********
   • http://www.kinchan.net/cgi-bin/**********


 Miscellaneous Mutex:
It creates the following Mutex:
   • bish u sux

 File details Programming language:
The malware program was written in MS Visual C++.


Runtime packer:
In order to aggravate detection and reduce size of the file it is packed with a runtime packer.

Description inserted by Irina Boldea on Thursday, March 9, 2006
Description updated by Irina Boldea on Tuesday, March 14, 2006

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