Virus: BDS/Haxdoor.AF Date discovered: 20/02/2006 Type: Backdoor Server In the wild: No Reported Infections: Low Distribution Potential: Low Damage Potential: Medium Static file: Yes File size: 23.877 Bytes MD5 checksum: 34feef2ba829a1843afa45464c0Efa0D VDF version: 6.33.01.11
General Method of propagation: • No own spreading routine Aliases: • Kaspersky: Trojan-Spy.Win32.Goldun.hp • TrendMicro: TSPY_GOLDUN.CI • Sophos: Troj/Goldun-BX • VirusBuster: trojan TrojanSpy.Goldun.CV • Bitdefender: Trojan.PWS.Goldspy.F Platforms / OS: • Windows 95 • Windows 98 • Windows 98 SE • Windows NT • Windows ME • Windows 2000 • Windows XP • Windows 2003 Side effects: • Drops a file • Drops malicious files • Registry modification • Steals information Files The following files are created: – Non malicious file: • %SYSDIR% \tick48.bin – %SYSDIR% \directut.dll Furthermore it gets executed after it was fully created. Further investigation pointed out that this file is malware, too. Detected as: TR/Agent.gh.2 – %SYSDIR% \directout.sys Further investigation pointed out that this file is malware, too. Detected as: TR/Spy.Goldun.HP Registry The following registry keys are added in order to run the processes after reboot: – [HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Winlogon\Notify\ directut] • "nk48id" = "[NG%random character string% ]" • "MaxWait" = dword:00000001 • "Asynchronous" = dword:00000001 • "Impersonate" = dword:00000001 • "Startup" = "directut" • "DllName" = "directut.dll" The following registry keys are added in order to load the service after reboot: – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\directout] • "Type"=dword:00000001 • "Start"=dword:00000001 • "ErrorControl"=dword:00000000 • "ImagePath"=\??\%SYSDIR% \directout.sys • "DisplayName"="Printer direct access" – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\directout\Security] • "Security"=%hex values% – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Services\directout\Enum] • "0"="Root\\LEGACY_DIRECTOUT\\0000" • "Count"=dword:00000001 • "NextInstance"=dword:00000001 – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_DIRECTOUT] • "NextInstance"=dword:00000001 – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_DIRECTOUT\0000] • "Service"="directout" • "Legacy"=dword:00000001 • "ConfigFlags"=dword:00000000 • "Class"="LegacyDriver" • "ClassGUID"="{8ECC055D-047F-11D1-A537-0000F8753ED1}" • "DeviceDesc"="Printer direct access" – [HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\Root\LEGACY_DIRECTOUT\0000\ Control] • "*NewlyCreated*"=dword:00000000 • "ActiveService"="directout" It creates the following entries in order to bypass the Windows XP firewall: – [HKLM\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\SharedAccess\Parameters\ FirewallPolicy\StandardProfile\AuthorizedApplications\List] • "%WINDIR% \Explorer.EXE"="%WINDIR% \Explorer.EXE:*:Enabled:explorer" • "\\??\\%SYSDIR% \winlogon.exe"="\\??\\%SYSDIR% \winlogon.exe:*:Enabled:explorer" Backdoor The following port is opened: – winlogon.exe on a random TCP port Contact server: The following: • www.skyinet.info/r4/********** As a result it may send some information. This is done via the HTTP GET and POST method using a PHP script. Sends information about: • IP address • Opened port • Collected information described in stealing section • Information about the Windows operating system Stealing It tries to steal the following information: – A logging routine is started after a website is visited: • %any HTTPS website that contains a login form% – It captures: • Login information Injection – It injects the following file into a process: directut.dll All of the following processes: • winlogon.exe • explorer.exe • %all processes started after malware is active in memory% Miscellaneous Time synchronisation: In order to synchronize the local time it contacts NTP server on port 123: • time.windows.com Rootkit Technology It is a malware-specific technology. The malware hides its presence from system utilities, security applications and in the end, from the user. Hides the following: – Its own files – Its own process Method used: • Hidden from Windows API File details Runtime packer: In order to aggravate detection and reduce size of the file it is packed with the following runtime packer: • FSG 2.0
Description inserted by Daniel Constantin on Wednesday, February 22, 2006 Description updated by Daniel Constantin on Monday, March 6, 2006
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